A generalization of the original definition of rough sets and variable precision rough sets is introduced. This generalization is based on the concept of absolute and relative rough membership. Similarly to variable precision rough set model, the generalization called parameterized rough set model, is aimed at modeling data relationships expressed in terms of frequency distribution rather than in terms of a full inclusion relation used in the classical definition of rough sets. However, differently from the variable precision rough set model, one or more parameters modeling the degree to which the condition attribute values confirm the decision attribute value, are considered. The properties of this extended model are investigated and compared to the classical rough set model and to the variable precision rough set model.
Introduction
In the rough set approach [7, 8] , classification of an object x from a universe U to a given set X U is based on available data. For example, in medical diagnosis, the objects are patients, the given set X is a set of patients suffering from a certain disease, and the available data are results of medical tests. Objects described by the same data are indiscernible in view of data and form elementary sets called granules. An elementary set including object x is denoted by [x] R , where R is the indiscernibility relation such that xRy means: x and y have the same description in the given data set. Thus, [x] R is the set of patients having the same results of the tests. The classification involves three regions:
-the positive region, including patients for which the available data suggest a certain membership to the given set, i.e. all x 2 U such that [x] R X, -the negative region, including patients for which the available data suggest a certain non-membership to the given set, i.e. all x 2 U such that [x] R \ X = ;, -the boundary region, including patients for which the available data suggest neither a certain membership nor a certain non-membership to the given set, i.e. all x 2 U such that [x] R \ X 5 ; and [x] R \ (U À X) 5 ;.
The Variable Precision Rough Set (VPRS) model [16, 17] defines the positive region as an area where, on the basis of available data, the rough membership of objects to the given set is certain to some degree. The rough membership [14, 10] is calculated from data as the frequency of objects from elementary set [x] R that belong to X: For example, in the medical diagnosis, the rough membership is calculated from data as the percentage of patients with the same results of the tests who suffer from the considered disease; the positive region includes patients whose rough membership to the set of patients suffering from the considered disease is not smaller than a given threshold 0 < t 6 1. Analogously, the negative region includes objects whose membership to set X is smaller than a given threshold 0 < q < t. Finally, the boundary region includes objects whose membership is between q and t.
The rough membership used to define the above regions, can be considered as an absolute rough membership, because it concerns elementary set [x] R only and does not take into account objects from X being outside the elementary set, i.e. in U À [x] R . Comparison of percentage of objects from X being inside and outside the elementary set, respectively, needs a concept of relative rough membership. Thus, for example, it is possible to define the relative rough membership of x in X aŝ
Consequently, the generalized VPRS model considered in this paper assumes that, in order to include object x in the positive region of set X, it is not sufficient to have a minimum percentage of objects from X in [x] R , but it is also necessary that the percentage of objects from X in [x] R is sufficiently greater than the percentage of objects from X outside [x] R . In other words, it is necessary that both the absolute and the relative memberships of x in X are not smaller than given thresholds t and a, respectively.
Coming back to the example of medical diagnosis, let us suppose that 80% of patients positive to all tests suffer from the disease. This would seem to suggest that the positive results of all tests indicates the presence of the disease. Thus, if we used the VPRS model with, say t = 0.75, we would include all the patients positive to all the tests in the positive region. Suppose, moreover, that, on the other hand, 85% of patients not positive to at least one test are suffering from the disease. Thus, passing from the set of patients with the positive results of all the tests to the set of patients not positive to at least one test, increases the percentage of patients suffering from the disease, instead of decreasing it. This means that the tests are not determinant for the diagnosis of the disease. Therefore, in contrast to the previous conclusion from the VPRS model, we should not include the patients with positive results of all the tests in the positive region. Using our generalization of the VPRS model, this is possible with, say t = 0.75 and a = 0.2. In fact, in this case we have that l R X ðxÞ > t butl R X ðxÞ < a for each patient x with positive results of all the tests.
Recently, the VPRS model has been enriched in [19] by adding a new constraint on the values of q and t: 0 6 q < Pr(X) < t 6 1, where Pr(X) is the probability of X that can be estimated as
In this case, we would have
Thus, 80% < Pr(X) < 85%, so in this version of the VPRS model, t will be certainly greater than 80% and, therefore, using our generalization of the VPRS model, we get the same conclusion, i.e. the patients with positive results of all the tests are not included in the positive region. Let us observe, however, that this version of the VPRS model can also be formulated in the following way: fix q and t as before, without taking into account Pr(X), and for including x 2 U in the positive region impose an additional condition thatl
and, remembering that
we get
Therefore, our extension includes also the recent VPRS model [19] , but our model is more general because we can consider any conditionl R X ðxÞ P a, and not onlyl R X ðxÞ > 0. The above definition ofl R X ðxÞ is one among many possible definitions because the relative rough membership is equivalent to an interestingness measure considered for decision rules in data mining (see, for example, [6, 15] for exhaustive reviews of the subject). For the sake of the simplicity, in this paper, we consider a class of interestingness measures related to the concept of Bayesian confirmation [5] .
Let us remark that the idea of using an interestingness measure for definition of variable precision rough approximations is not new (see for example [18, 13, 12] ), however, it has been used with respect to a single condition of membership. In this paper, we are considering for the first time two conditions of membership, corresponding to absolute and relative rough memberships, and representing two complementary aspects of rough approximation.
The article extends the short paper previously published by the authors in Ref. [4] . It is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces confirmation measures and recalls some desirable properties of symmetry and asymmetry proposed by Eells and Fitelson [2] . Section 3 gives some basic notions concerning decision rules and decision algorithms within rough set approach. Section 4 introduces rough set confirmation measures. Section 5 presents and characterizes our parameterized rough set model. Section 6 gives conclusions.
Confirmation measures
According to Fitelson [3] , measures of confirmation quantify the degree to which a piece of evidence E provides ''evidence for or against'' or ''support for or against'' a hypothesis H. Fitelson remarks, moreover, that measures of confirmation are supposed to capture the impact rather than the final result of the ''absorption'' of a piece of evidence.
Bayesian confirmation assumes the existence of a probability Pr. In the following, given a proposition X, Pr(X) is the probability of X. Considering propositions X and Y and assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that Pr(Y) 5 0, Pr(XjY) represents the probability of X given Y, i.e.
In this context, a measure of confirmation of a piece of evidence E with respect to a hypothesis H is denoted by c(E, H). Let us remark that, usually, confirmation measure is denoted by c(H, E) (see, for example, Fitelson [3] ), emphasizing the fact that it is related to the probability of H given E. We prefer, however, to use c(E, H) in order to enhance direction of the consequence relation from E to H. c(E, H) is required to satisfy the following minimal property:
: ðiÞ
The most well known confirmation measures proposed in the literature are the following:
sðE; H Þ ¼ PrðH j EÞ À PrðH j :EÞ;
bðE; H Þ ¼ PrðH^EÞ À PrðH ÞPrðEÞ:
For the sake of the simplicity we suppose that Pr(HjE), Pr(EjH), PrðE j :H Þ and Pr(H) are always different from zero and, therefore, the above measures (more precisely, r(E, H), l(E, H) and f(E, H)) are always well defined.
Many authors have considered, moreover, some more or less desirable properties of confirmation measures. Fitelson [3] makes a comprehensive survey of these considerations. At the end of his retrospective, Fitelson concludes that the most convincing confirmation measures are l(E, H) and f(E, H). He also notes that l(E, H) and f(E, H) are ordinally equivalent, i.e. for all E, H and
. Among the properties of confirmation measures reviewed by Fitelson [3] , there are properties of symmetry introduced by Carnap [1] and investigated recently by Eells and Fitelson [2] . For all E and H, one can have: [2] remark that, given (CS), (ES) and (HS) are equivalent, and that (TS) follows from the conjunction of (ES) and (HS). Moreover, they advocate in favor of (HS) and against (ES), (CS) and (TS). The reason in favor of (HS) is that the significance of E with respect to H should be of the same strength, but of opposite sign, as the significance of E with respect to :H . Eells and Fitelson [2] prove that: Thus, assuming that (HS) is a desirable property, while (ES), (CS) and (TS) are not, Eells and Fitelson [2] conclude that with respect to the property of symmetry, d, f and l are satisfactory confirmation measures while s, r and b are not satisfactory confirmation measures.
Eells and Fitelson
Let us also recall the absolute certainty gain [19] , which is similar to d(E, H) because it is defined using the difference between Pr(HjE) and Pr(H):
Thus, gabs(E, H) is equivalent to the absolute value of d(E, H) and, therefore, it does not give any information about the positive or negative sign of the impact of evidence E on hypothesis H, which is the core idea of confirmation measures. Obviously, gabs(E, H) is not a confirmation measure, as it does not satisfy property (i), thus we do not take into account gabs(E, H) in further considerations.
Decision rules and decision algorithm
Let S = (U, A) be an information table, where U and A are finite, non-empty sets called the universe and the set of attributes, respectively. If in the set A two disjoint subsets of attributes, called condition and decision attributes, are distinct, then the system is called a decision table, and is denoted by S = (U, C, D), where C and D are sets of condition and decision attributes, respectively. With every subset of attributes, one can associate a formal language of logical formulas L, defined in a standard way and called the decision language. Formulas for a subset B A are build up from attribute value pairs (a, v), where a 2 B and v 2 V a (V a is the value set of a), by means of logical connectives^(and), _ (or), : (not).
A decision rule induced from S and expressed in L is presented as U ! W, read ''if U, then W'', where U and W are condition and decision formulas in L, called premise and conclusion, respectively. A decision rule U ! W is also seen as a binary relation between premise and conclusion, called consequence relation (see critical discussion about interpretation of decision rules as logical implications in Ref. [5] .
Let kUk denote the set of all objects from universe U, having property U in S. If cer S (U, W) = 1, then decision rule U ! W will be called certain, otherwise the decision rule will be referred to as uncertain.
A set of decision rules supported in total by the universe U constitutes a decision algorithm in S. Pawlak [9] points out that every decision algorithm associated with S displays well known probabilistic properties. In particular, it satisfies the total probability theorem and Bayes' theorem. As a decision algorithm can also be interpreted in terms of the rough set concept, these properties give a new look on Bayes' theorem from the rough set perspective. In consequence, one can draw conclusions from data without referring to prior and posterior probabilities, inherently associated with Bayesian reasoning. The revealed relationship can be used to invert decision rules, i.e. giving reasons (explanations) for decisions, which is useful in decision analysis.
Confirmation measures and decision algorithms
In this section, we translate confirmation measures into the language of decision algorithms. A preliminary question that arises naturally in this context is the following: why a new measure is required for decision rules in addition to strength, certainty and coverage? In other words, what is the intuition behind the confirmation measure that motivates its use for characterization of decision rules?
To answer this question, it will be useful to recall the following example proposed by Popper [11] . Consider the possible results of rolling a die: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. We can built a decision table, presented in Table 1 , where the fact that the result is even or odd is the condition attribute, while the result itself is the decision attribute.
Let us consider the case W = ''the result is 6'' and the case :W = ''the result is not 6''. Let us also take into account the information U = ''the result is an even number (i.e. 2 or 4 or 6)''. Therefore, we can consider the following two decision rules:
• U ! W = ''if the result is even, then the result is 6'', with certainty cer S (U, W) = 1/3, • U ! :W ¼''if the result is even, then the result is not 6'', with certainty cer S ðU; :WÞ ¼ 2=3.
Note that the rule U ! W has a smaller certainty than the rule U ! :W. However, the probability that the result is 6 is 1/6, while the probability that the result is different from 6 is 5/6. Thus, the information U increases the probability of W from 1/6 to 1/3, and decreases the probability of : W from 5/6 to 2/3. In conclusion, we can say that U confirms W and disconfirms :W, independently of the fact that the certainty of U ! W is smaller than the certainty of U ! :W. This simple example shows that certainty and confirmation are two completely different concepts, so it advocates for a new index expressing the latter type of information.
Given a decision rule U ! W, the confirmation measure we want to introduce should give the credibility of the proposition: W is satisfied more frequently when U is satisfied rather than when U is not satisfied.
Differently from Bayesian confirmation, however, we start from a decision table rather than from a probability measure. In this context, the probability Pr of U is substituted by the relative frequency Fr in the considered data table S, i.e. Fr S (U) = card(kUk)/card(U).
Analogously, given U and W, Pr(WjU) -the probability of W given U -is substituted by the certainty factor cer S (U, W) of the decision rule U ! W.
Therefore, a measure of confirmation of property W by property U, denoted by c(U, W), where U is a condition formula in L and W is a decision formula in L, is required to satisfy the following minimal property ðiiÞ Definition (ii) can be interpreted as follows:
• c(U, W) > 0 means that property W is satisfied more frequently when U is satisfied (then, this frequency is cer S (U, W)), rather than generically in the whole decision table (where this frequency is Fr S (W)), • c(U, W) = 0 means that property W is satisfied with the same frequency when U is satisfied and, generically, in the whole decision table, • c(U, W) < 0 means that property W is satisfied less frequently when U is satisfied, rather than generically in the whole decision table.
Observe that (ii) can also be interpreted as follows:
• c(U, W) > 0 means that property W is satisfied more frequently when U is satisfied, rather than when U is not satisfied, • c(U, W) = 0 means that property W is satisfied with the same frequency when U is satisfied and when U is not satisfied, • c(U, W) < 0 means that property W is satisfied more frequently when U is not satisfied, rather than when U is satisfied.
The specific confirmation measures recalled in Section 2 can be rewritten in this context as follows: Clearly, all the results about confirmation measures obtained within Bayesian confirmation theory are valid for the confirmation measures defined in the context of decision algorithms considered within rough set theory.
In this context, moreover, a new monotonicity property (M) introduced in [5] is desirable for confirmation measures. The monotonicity (M) says that the confirmation measure c(U, W) must be non-decreasing with respect to supp S (U, W) and supp S ð:U; :WÞ, and non-increasing with respect to supp S ð:U; WÞ and supp S ðU; :WÞ.
The arguments proposed by Greco et al. [5] for monotonicity property are the following. Given probability Pr, evidence U confirms hypothesis W, if PrðUjWÞ > PrðUj:WÞ. Translating probability in terms of certainty, one can say that evidence U confirms hypothesis W, if cer S ðU; WÞ > cer S ðU; :WÞ. Greco et al. [5] proved that it is possible to pass from one situation in which evidence U does not confirm hypothesis W, i.e. cer S ðU; WÞ < cer S ðU; :WÞ, to a situation in which evidence U confirms hypothesis W, i.e. cer S ðU; WÞ > cer S ðU; :WÞ, when supp S (U, W) or supp S ð:U; :WÞ increases, or supp S ð:U; WÞ or supp S ðU; :WÞ decreases. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a confirmation measure c(U, W) is non-decreasing with respect to supp S (U, W) and supp S ð:U; :WÞ, and non-increasing with respect to supp S ð:U; WÞ and supp S ðU; :WÞ.
The confirmation measures verifying monotonicity are l(U, W), f(U, W) and s(U, W), whereas monotonicity does not hold for d(U, W), r(U, W) and b(U, W) [5] . Therefore, the only confirmation measures which are satisfactory from the viewpoint of both symmetry property and monotonicity property (M) are the two ordinally equivalent confirmation measures l(U, W) and f(U, W).
Below, we will use these confirmation measures as relative rough membership functions. For this reason, in the following we shall denote relative rough membership function by c(x, X), rather than byl R X ðxÞ.
Parameterized rough set model
Suppose we are given a finite set U 5 ; (the universe) of objects we are interested in. If R is an equivalence relation on U, then by U/R we mean the family of all the equivalence classes of R and [x] R denotes the equivalence class of x 2 U. Given a set X U, the lower and the upper approximations of X in U are defined, respectively, as RðX Þ ¼ fx 2 U : ½x R X g; RðX Þ ¼ fx 2 U : ½x R \ X 6 ¼ ;g: Set BN R ðX Þ ¼ RðX Þ À RðX Þ will be called the R-boundary of X. Let t and q be two real valued parameters, called lower limit and upper limit, respectively, such that 0 6 q < t 6 1. According to the VPRS model [16, 17] , the lower and the upper approximations of X in U are defined, respectively, as
Ś le ßzak [12] proposed an alternative parameterized rough set model, called rough Bayesian model, in which the lower and upper approximations of X are defined as follows:
; where e t , e q 2 (1, +1), such that e t > e q . Let us consider now the relative rough membership functions c(x, X) for x 2 U and X U. c(x, X) is defined as a measure of confirmation that evidence y 2 [x] R about an object y from U gives to hypothesis y 2 X. They clearly correspond to confirmation measures introduced in Section 4, as follows:
Let us remark that in the above definitions of relative rough membership functions, the log function takes the following extreme values: log (0/a) = À1 and log (a/0) = +1, for all a > 0.
Let a and b, a P b, be two real values in the range of variation of each relative rough membership c(x, X) (for example, if c(x, X) = d(x, X), then a,b 2 [À1, 1]) and 0 6 q 6 t 6 1. The parameterized lower and upper approximations of X in U with respect to relative rough membership c(x, X) are defined, respectively, as
One can notice that the above definitions boil down to the following special cases:
1. The classical rough set model [7] , when t = 1, q = 0, a = b = min{c(x, X): x 2 U and X U}. This definition does not involve neither absolute nor relative rough membership. 2. The VPRS model [16, 17] , when 0 6 q < t 6 1, a = b = min{c(x, X): x 2 U and X U}. This definition involves an absolute rough membership only. 3. The rough Bayesian model [12] , when t = q = 0, c(x, X) = l(x, X), and a = log e t , b = log e q . In fact, we can rewrite R et ðX Þ and R eq ðX Þ as follows:
This definition involves a relative rough membership only.
Our parameterized rough set model is the most general since it involves both absolute and relative rough memberships; moreover, it can be generalized further by considering more than one relative rough membership. 
Proof
(1) For every relative rough membership c(x, X), for every X U, for every q, t 2 [0, 1], with q < t, and for every a, b in the range of variation of relative rough membership c(x, X), such that a > b, we have that
and thus
that is
which is what we had to prove.
(2) Let us observe that (i)
Moreover, we have that:
From (i)-(vi), we get that
We also have that
and 8a 2 R; (x)
Moreover, we have that (xi)
For (vii) and (ix) we have
for (vii) and (x) we have
for (viii) and (xi) we have
for (viii) and (xii) we have
For (viii) and (xiii) we have
Results of Theorem 1 correspond to very well known properties of the classical rough set model and the VPRS model. More precisely, (1) means that the lower approximation is always included in the upper approximation, and (2) represents complementarity property (given that some conditions are satisfied, the lower approximation is the complement of the upper approximation of the complement). (3) and (4) 
(1) Let us consider the following case: when using d(x, X),
• a > log 1 91 100 when using r(x, X),
when using s(x, X), • a > 10 100 À 10 100 91 100 when using b(x, X), we get that x 6 2 R t,a (X) while x 2 R(X) and, therefore, it is false that R t;a ðX Þ RðX Þ:
(2) Let us consider the same case of the previous point. We have that
• dðx; U À X Þ ¼ À : Now, if we fix
• b 6 À (3b) Let us consider the following case: The fact that some very typical properties of rough sets do not hold in the context of the parameterized rough set model is due to the behavior of some relative rough membership functions. However, even if the use of a relative rough membership function causes violation of some typical properties of rough approximations, the parameterized rough set model gives a much more complete and realistic insight into data analysis. In fact, there is a tradeoff between the elegance of a mathematical model, typical for the classical rough set model and the VPRS model, on one side, and the richer formulation permitting to control many specific aspects of data analysis, typical for the parameterized rough set model, on the other side. Let us observe, however, that relative rough membership functions l(x, X) and f(x, X) are the only ones for which all properties from Theorem 1 hold and, therefore, they are the most satisfactory, which is concordant with the results of Fitelson [3] and Eells and Fitelson [2] . Anyway, also l(x, X) and f(x, X) do not satisfy the properties listed in point 3 of Theorem 2.
Let us conclude this section with the remark that, since the above confirmation measures are related to different aspects of data analysis, the parameterized rough set model can be simply generalized by considering two or even more relative rough membership functions.
The parameterized lower and upper approximations of X U with respect to relative rough membership functions c 1 (x, X), . . . , c h (x, X) are defined, respectively, as ; with 0 6 q 6 t 6 1 and a i P b i for all i = 1,. . . , h.
Conclusions
We presented a parameterized rough set model that is a generalization of the VPRS model. Differently from the VPRS model, however, we do not take into account the frequency distribution only, but also the degree to which the condition attribute values confirm the membership of an object to the approximated set. Consequently, we propose to use two kinds of parameters corresponding to absolute and relative rough membership. This model gives a richer insight into data analysis, compared to competitive rough set models, and this compensates the violation of some properties that are typically verified by rough set models.
